
By Professor Habib Al Badawi
The dissolution of the twenty-six-year alliance between the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito on October 10, 2025, marks a defining moment in contemporary Japanese politics. For over two decades, this partnership anchored Japan’s post-Cold War governance, ensuring policy continuity, maintaining legislative stability, and fusing conservative statecraft with Buddhist-backed social moderation (Curtis, 2016). Komeito’s withdrawal, prompted by corruption concerns and leadership discord, has disrupted the balance of power within the National Diet and exposed deep ideological fractures within Japan’s political landscape (Stockwin, 2021).
This rupture reflects broader institutional fatigue and shifting voter alignments that have challenged LDP dominance throughout the postwar period. The alliance’s dissolution has reconfigured Japan’s party system, weakened the policy-making apparatus, and reintroduced political volatility reminiscent of the pre-2012 era when Japan experienced frequent government changes and unstable coalitions (Reed et al., 2012). The resulting uncertainty has created space for emerging movements such as Sanseito and the reinvigorated Constitutional Democratic Party, signaling erosion of the one-party predominance that characterized Japanese politics for decades.
Japan’s coalition breakdown reflects global trends of ideological polarization and declining trust in established elites while underscoring Japan’s unique struggle to reconcile stability with accountability, a dilemma rooted in its political culture (Curtis, 2016). As Tokyo navigates economic challenges, demographic decline, and strategic rivalries in an increasingly unstable Indo-Pacific, the end of the LDP-Komeito partnership creates both apprehension over governance paralysis and possibility for political renewal. This analysis examines the coalition’s collapse as both a political autopsy and a forward-looking inquiry into evolving dynamics of power, ideology, and legitimacy in Japan’s democracy.
Political Implications and the Unraveling of the Post-Cold War Order
The Immediate Crisis of Legislative Paralysis
Komeito’s withdrawal stripped the ruling coalition of its comfortable majority in both Diet houses, creating an immediate legislative crisis with potentially long-term systemic ramifications. The LDP now lacks votes to pass contentious legislation or budgets unilaterally, forcing Prime Minister Ishiba and any potential successor into precarious negotiations with opposition parties (Saito, 2025). According to Kazuto (2025), this development signals “the end of the traditional political system where the LDP is in the center,” fundamentally altering legislative mechanics and policy formulation.
The practical implications extend across virtually every governance domain. Key policies on national security, economic stimulus, social welfare reforms, and fiscal management risk being diluted through compromise or stalled indefinitely. The LDP-Komeito coalition holds only 221 seats in the Lower House, falling twelve votes short of the 233 needed to pass legislation in the 465-member chamber. These arithmetic forces what Takahashi (2025) characterizes as “policy-to-policy” coordination with opposition parties, either individually or collectively. Such transactional legislative processes undermine comprehensive policy reform on complex issues requiring sustained political commitment.
Beyond vote-counting, minority governance inherently dilutes policy ambition. Each piece of legislation becomes subject to bargaining, amendment, and potential obstruction by parties with divergent ideological commitments. Curtis (2016) identifies this as a fundamental tension in Japanese politics between strong, decisive leadership and institutional constraints imposed by coalition governance. The current crisis magnifies this tension exponentially, as the government lacks even the basic coalition structure that previously provided a stable foundation for legislative action.
The Dual Crisis of Leadership and Legitimacy
The coalition’s collapse precipitated a dual crisis of leadership and legitimacy that strikes at the heart of executive authority. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, having led the minority government since the ruling coalition lost general elections the previous year, finds himself in an increasingly untenable position. Described by Takahashi (2025) as a “lame duck” premier, Ishiba struggles to maintain authority within his fractious party and on the international stage. His predicament exemplifies the broader legitimacy crisis: he leads a government lacking both a parliamentary majority and the political capital necessary to command respect domestically or internationally.
Simultaneously, Sanae Takaichi’s premiership bid has been thrown into serious doubt. Her ultra-conservative profile, particularly regarding historical issues, security policy, and constitutional revision, played a significant role in the coalition’s rupture (Takaichi, 2025). Without Komeito as a coalition partner, securing cross-party support for the premiership becomes extraordinarily difficult. The irony is acute: Takaichi’s LDP leadership victory demonstrated substantial support within the party’s conservative base, yet this success complicated her path to premiership by alienating potential coalition partners essential for stable government (Shih, 2025).
This dual leadership crisis creates prolonged executive weakness unprecedented in recent Japanese political history. Neither leader possesses the combination of parliamentary support, party unity, and public legitimacy necessary for effective governance. Ishiba, cognizant of “harsh” conditions facing his administration, has resisted calls to step down, pledging to “sincerely deepen discussions with other parties.” Yet his commitment to seeking “bipartisan” support appears increasingly hollow given opposition reluctance to support a weakened administration without extracting significant policy concessions (Takahashi, 2025). The result is a government that governs in name but struggles to govern in practice.
Systemic Realignment and the Rise of Alternative Forces
The coalition’s collapse shattered the traditional one-party-dominant system, creating a political vacuum that emerging and opposition parties are positioning to fill. The right-wing populist Sanseito party, running on a “Japanese First” platform, was declared the election’s “biggest beneficiary,” winning fifteen seats and indicating willingness to cooperate with the LDP coalition (Kazuto, 2025). This reflects deeper currents of nationalist sentiment and dissatisfaction with established political elites that have emerged across Japanese society.
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) has consolidated significant parliamentary representation, with 126 seats in the upper house and 244 in the lower house when combined with other opposition forces. Yet this opposition bloc remains fundamentally fragmented, divided by policy differences on economic management, security, and social issues that preclude coherent alternative government formation (Stockwin, 2021). The Democratic Party for the People (DPP), holding twenty-one seats in the lower house, exemplifies this fragmentation. Having previously supported the Ishiba government after the ruling coalition’s electoral setback, the DPP has since felt betrayed by LDP-Komeito actions, yet its policy positions align more closely with ruling parties than with broader opposition on many economic issues (Shih, 2025).
This configuration suggests a potential shift toward a more volatile, multi-party system reminiscent of the pre-2012 “revolving door politics” characterized by frequent government changes, short-lived coalitions, and policy inconsistency (Reed et al., 2012). Unlike that earlier period featuring competition among essentially centrist parties with modest policy differences, the current realignment introduces more ideologically distinctive actors. Sanseito’s nationalist populism and the CDPJ’s progressive social agenda represent genuinely different visions for Japan’s future, making coalition formation more complex and potentially more unstable. This ideological diversification, while potentially enriching democratic debate, increases coalition complexity and reduces governance predictability (Curtis, 2016).
Economic Implications and the Perils of Policy Drift
Domestic Economic Gridlock and the Cost-of-Living Crisis
Political instability undermines Japan’s capacity to address pressing domestic challenges effectively. The cost-of-living crisis, high inflation unprecedented in recent Japanese economic history, and necessary tax reforms require tough political decisions that a weakened minority administration struggles to deliver. The risk of “policy drift,” where necessary economic measures are delayed, diluted, or abandoned due to political constraints, carries particularly serious consequences for an economy already grappling with demographic decline and stagnant growth (Shih, 2025).
The cost-of-living crisis demands immediate government attention. Inflation, taxes, and immigration emerged as top election issues, closely tied to broader concerns about Japan’s economic development trajectory (Kazuto, 2025). Japanese household savings are eroding rapidly under persistent inflationary pressure, undermining the traditional middle-class security that characterized postwar Japanese society. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated fiscal and monetary policy responses, targeted social welfare interventions, and potentially controversial reforms to labor markets and industrial policy. Yet a government lacking secure parliamentary majorities finds itself unable to marshal political capital for such comprehensive action.
The paralysis extends to longer-term structural reforms essential for Japan’s economic future. Demographic decline, with cascading effects on labor supply, consumption patterns, pension sustainability, and regional vitality, demands transformative policy interventions that inevitably create winners and losers. Immigration reform, enhanced childcare support, pension restructuring, and labor market flexibility all require sustained political commitment and the ability to weather opposition from entrenched interests. A minority government, dependent on ad hoc parliamentary coalitions and vulnerable to no-confidence votes, fundamentally lacks institutional capacity to pursue such transformative agendas (Curtis, 2016).
External Vulnerability and the Tariff Negotiation Crisis
The coalition’s collapse created particularly acute challenges in Japan’s international economic relations, most critically in ongoing tariff negotiations with the United States. According to Takahashi (2025), the election results represent “a disaster for the tariff talks,” as “Japan needs a united front right now, which is the last thing on anybody’s mind as the parties jostle for power.” Successful negotiation requires credible domestic political authority capable of making commitments and delivering on agreements. A weak Japanese government lacks the mandate to secure favorable terms from negotiating counterparts.
The urgency is amplified by the August 1 deadline for completing negotiations. Shih (2025) predicts that “following the election defeat, the Ishiba administration is unlikely to make concessions in tariff negotiations with the US. If he is ultimately forced to resign, this will bring critical trade negotiations to an abrupt halt. In other words, it has become nearly impossible to complete negotiations by the Aug. 1 deadline.” This captures the dual bind facing Japanese negotiators: domestic political weakness prevents bold negotiating stances that might yield favorable outcomes, while the constant threat of government collapse creates uncertainty about the implementation of any agreement reached.
The implications extend beyond bilateral trade relations to Japan’s position within regional and global economic architectures. As Takahashi (2025) noted, US President Donald Trump “has shown he has no respect for a loser, which is what Ishiba is right now,” leaving “Japan in a very weak position” in international negotiations. This external perception of weakness can become self-reinforcing, as international partners adjust expectations and strategies based on assessments of Japan’s domestic political stability. For an export-driven economy vulnerable to external trade barriers and dependent on foreign market access, this bargaining weakness carries substantial economic consequences (Stockwin, 2021).
Market Uncertainty and Investment Hesitation
Financial markets respond with sensitivity to political volatility, as investors prize stability and predictability, enabling rational economic planning and risk assessment. The “political volatility reminiscent of the pre-2012 era” introduced by the coalition’s collapse unsettles financial markets and potentially deters investment that Japan’s economy needs (Kazuto, 2025). Market participants incorporate political risk assessments into their decision-making. A government facing potential collapse, parliamentary gridlock on economic legislation, or snap elections represents a significant source of such risk.
Market uncertainty manifests across multiple dimensions of economic activity. Corporate investment decisions, particularly in long-term capital projects requiring sustained policy support and regulatory stability, become difficult to justify when the political and policy environment appears fluid and unpredictable. Foreign direct investment, crucial for technology transfer, employment generation, and industrial dynamization, similarly responds negatively to perceptions of political instability. International investors evaluating allocation decisions across Asian markets may downgrade Japan relative to competitors offering greater political stability and policy predictability (Reed et al., 2012).
Currency markets provide perhaps the most immediate barometer of political uncertainty, as exchange rates rapidly incorporate changing assessments of economic prospects and policy credibility. Sustained political crisis could trigger currency volatility that complicates monetary policy management, affects import prices and inflation dynamics, and creates balance sheet risks for firms with foreign currency exposures. The Bank of Japan, already navigating complex challenges in normalizing monetary policy after decades of extraordinary accommodation, finds its task complicated by political uncertainty affecting inflation expectations, growth prospects, and fiscal policy credibility (Curtis, 2016).
Institutional Implications and the Erosion of Governance Norms
The Conditional Nature of Coalition Durability and Trust
The rupture between the LDP and Komeito demonstrates that even the most enduring political alliances remain fundamentally conditional, vulnerable to dissolution when core principles are violated. Komeito framed its withdrawal as a “principled response” to what it characterized as the LDP’s “inadequate” handling of a political-funding scandal, rather than as tactical maneuvering driven by electoral calculations (Saito, 2025). This framing highlights how institutional trust functions as a political multiplier, amplifying or dampening effects of specific events based on broader relationship context. For Komeito, whose legitimacy is anchored to the clean-government ethos of its Soka Gakkai base, reputational damage from association with corruption represents an existential threat, forcing decisive action overriding decades of pragmatic cooperation.
Long-term accumulation of “structural fatigue” within the coalition created vulnerabilities that a discrete scandal could exploit and transform into irreparable rupture. Long coalitions inevitably accumulate grievances over policy concessions, seat allocation disputes, ideological compromises, and reputational spillovers that slowly erode the foundation of trust and shared purpose (Stockwin, 2021). These accumulated tensions may remain manageable during periods of electoral success and policy achievement, when coalition benefits clearly outweigh costs. However, they create latent fault lines that discrete shocks can activate, transforming underlying tensions into open conflict. The immediate scandal over political funding served as the proximate cause, but deeper causal dynamics involved structural stress accumulated over more than a quarter-century of collaboration.
This pattern reflects broader theoretical insights about coalition dynamics in parliamentary systems. Curtis (2016) observes that coalition durability depends not merely on instrumental calculations about policy outcomes or electoral advantage, but on deeper normative commitments and shared understandings about appropriate conduct and mutual obligations. When partners perceive that these normative foundations have been violated through corruption, policy betrayal, or disrespect, instrumental calculations that might otherwise sustain cooperation become insufficient. Komeito’s withdrawal exemplifies this dynamic: the party concluded that continued association with the LDP posed greater risks to its core identity and constituency relationships than the costs of opposition status.
Ideological Reconfiguration and the Removal of Centrist Ballast
The LDP-Komeito coalition had functioned for over two decades as a moderating mechanism within Japanese conservatism, fusing the LDP’s traditional conservative statecraft with Komeito’s social-moderate orientation and welfare-oriented policy preferences. This fusion created what Stockwin (2021) characterizes as a “centrist-conservative synthesis” that blunted the LDP’s harder ideological edges while providing Komeito with influence over policy domains central to its constituency interests, particularly in social welfare, education, and peace issues. The coalition’s dissolution removes this centrist ballast from Japanese conservatism, potentially allowing more ideologically pure but socially divisive tendencies to emerge.
The election of Sanae Takaichi as LDP leader symbolizes and accelerates this ideological shift. Her ultra-conservative profile, particularly regarding historical issues, constitutional revision, and security policy, represents a departure from the more pragmatic conservatism that characterized LDP leadership during the coalition era (Takaichi, 2025). Without Komeito’s moderating influence, the LDP may feel less constrained in pursuing ideologically driven policies on constitutional amendment, military expansion, historical memory, and social issues. This ideological liberation could energize the party’s conservative base but risks alienating moderate voters who traditionally viewed the LDP as a pragmatic, center-right party rather than an ideologically rigid conservative movement (Shih, 2025).
The implications extend beyond the LDP to the broader configuration of Japan’s party system. With the traditional LDP-Komeito center-right coalition fractured, political space opens for more ideologically distinctive actors across the spectrum. The success of Sanseito, with its explicitly nationalist “Japanese First” platform, suggests growing electoral appeal for right-populist politics that eschews postwar consensus on pacifism, international cooperation, and measured nationalism (Kazuto, 2025). On the left, the Constitutional Democratic Party may feel emboldened to articulate more progressive positions on social issues, economic redistribution, and environmental policy. While this ideological diversification may enrich democratic debate, it complicates coalition formation and reduces governance predictability (Curtis, 2016).
Governance Paradigms and the Structural Inflection Point
The coalition’s collapse forces fundamental rethinking of how Japan is governed, presenting political actors with several challenging governance models. The first involves minority government, where the LDP continues governing without a secure parliamentary majority, relying on ad hoc deals with opposition parties to pass specific legislation. This approach, while preserving LDP dominance, inevitably leads to legislative gridlock on controversial issues, policy fragmentation as different bills require different coalition configurations, and transactional politics that prioritize short-term bargaining over coherent long-term strategy (Takahashi, 2025). Minority governments can function effectively when opposition parties exercise “responsible” opposition by supporting necessary government initiatives, but such conditions require political maturity and institutional norms that may not be fully developed in contemporary Japan.
The second model involves the formation of a new coalition, requiring the LDP to identify and negotiate with an alternative partner capable of providing the parliamentary arithmetic necessary for stable governance. Kazuto (2025) observes that “Japanese politics is going to be in chaos unless the LDP can find a new partner to form a new coalition. But there seems to be no party interested in being part of it.” Potential partners are either ideologically incompatible with LDP positions on core issues, too small to provide meaningful parliamentary support, or politically damaged by association with previous coalition arrangements. The Democratic Party for the People represents the most plausible partner in arithmetic terms, holding twenty-one seats that could tip the balance, but the party has felt betrayed by previous LDP-Komeito actions and faces internal divisions about whether to support or oppose the ruling party. Sanseito’s willingness to cooperate offers another possibility, but incorporating an explicitly nationalist party into a governing coalition would carry significant reputational and diplomatic costs (Shih, 2025).
The third model involves snap elections that might resolve the current impasse by providing one political bloc with a clear electoral mandate for governance. Elections could clarify the political situation, either strengthening the LDP’s position if voters rally to established leadership or providing opposition forces with the mandate necessary to form an alternative government. However, elections could accelerate political fragmentation if voters distribute support across multiple parties without giving any single bloc a clear majority, potentially replicating or worsening current parliamentary arithmetic (Curtis, 2016). The prospect of campaign dynamics under current conditions—with the LDP lacking Komeito’s traditional campaign support, emerging parties like Sanseito gaining momentum, and opposition forces sensing opportunity—suggests that electoral outcomes would be highly unpredictable.
A fourth scenario involves reconciliation between the LDP and Komeito through negotiations producing stricter political-funding reforms and symbolic concessions. This would allow Komeito’s return but appears unlikely. Given the public nature of Komeito’s withdrawal and the principled framing of its decision, reconciliation would require more than cosmetic reforms. Saito’s (2025) statement announcing the withdrawal emphasized fundamental concerns about corruption and governance that cannot be easily resolved through tactical adjustments. Moreover, the elevation of Takaichi to LDP leadership has intensified ideological tensions that complicate potential reconciliation, as Komeito would need assurances not merely about political funding practices but about broader policy directions.
These alternative governance models represent a structural inflection point for Japanese democracy, marking a moment when established trajectories become unsustainable and systems must transition to new configurations. An inflection point captures both crisis and opportunity, forcing a “delicate balancing act” between pursuing accountability for corruption that might restore public trust and avoiding governance paralysis that prevents effective response to pressing challenges (Stockwin, 2021). This balancing act requires political actors to navigate competing imperatives: satisfying demands for political reform while maintaining governance capacity, accommodating ideological diversity while building functional coalitions, and preserving stability while allowing democratic renewal.
Conclusion: Crisis, Renewal, and Japan’s Democratic Future
The withdrawal of Komeito from its quarter-century alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party represents a fundamental rupture that exposes and accelerates transformative dynamics within Japanese politics, economics, and institutional governance. The collapse produces immediate crises of legislative paralysis, leadership legitimacy, and policy-making capacity, while simultaneously revealing deeper structural tensions that accumulated beneath the surface of apparent stability. The political implications manifest in fragmented parliamentary arithmetic, weakened executive authority, and emerging space for alternative political forces across the ideological spectrum. The economic consequences appear in policy drift on critical domestic challenges, external vulnerability in international negotiations, and market uncertainty that deters investment. The institutional revelations underscore the conditional nature of political alliances, the centrality of trust in coalition maintenance, and the profound challenge of governing effectively amid ideological diversification and electoral fragmentation.
These interconnected implications converge to create a structural inflection point for Japanese democracy. Whether this leads toward democratic revitalization or prolonged instability depends fundamentally on political actors’ capacity to transcend narrow partisan calculations and forge new institutional arrangements capable of restoring public trust while enabling effective governance. The path forward requires navigating complex terrain between competing imperatives: maintaining stability while pursuing accountability, accommodating ideological diversity while building functional coalitions, and preserving continuity while enabling necessary reform.
The lessons from this rupture extend beyond Japan to illuminate broader dynamics of coalition politics in advanced democracies. The case demonstrates that longevity does not guarantee stability, as even durable alliances remain vulnerable to accumulated grievances and discrete shocks that exploit latent fault lines. It highlights how parties anchoring their legitimacy to religious or community networks face distinctive pressures when partner misconduct threatens reputational damage, potentially forcing existential choices that override instrumental cooperation. It underscores how coalition breakdowns in contexts of electoral fragmentation and ideological diversification produce outsized systemic effects on governance capacity, policy predictability, and international bargaining power.
Looking forward, Japan’s political trajectory remains genuinely uncertain, with multiple plausible scenarios offering dramatically different implications for governance, policy, and democratic legitimacy. Minority governance, new coalition formation, snap elections, and reconciliation each present distinctive challenges and opportunities whose ultimate outcomes depend on decisions not yet made. What remains clear is that Japan has entered a period of profound political fluidity unprecedented in recent decades.
The post-Cold War settlement that anchored Japanese governance for a quarter-century has definitively ended, creating both apprehension about potential paralysis and possibility for democratic renewal. How Japan navigates this inflection point—whether political actors prove capable of translating crisis into constructive institutional reform, or whether the system descends into prolonged instability—will shape not merely the immediate political landscape but the longer-term evolution of Japanese democracy and its capacity to address formidable challenges of the twenty-first century.
The coalition’s collapse serves simultaneously as a conclusion and a beginning: the conclusion of an era of stable conservative governance anchored in pragmatic coalition politics and the beginning of a more uncertain but potentially more dynamic period in which Japanese democracy must rediscover effective governance through new institutional arrangements, renewed public engagement, and rebuilt political trust. The ultimate judgment on this transformative moment must await the unfolding of political developments still in motion, but the significance of the rupture itself is undeniable. Japan stands at a critical juncture, facing choices about political organization, governance philosophy, and institutional reform that will reverberate through the coming decades.
References
Curtis, G. L. (2016). The logic of Japanese politics: Leaders, institutions, and the limits of change. Columbia University Press.
Kazuto, S. (2025). Interview with Anadolu Agency: The end of Japan’s traditional political system and the future of LDP-led governance. Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo.
Reed, S. R., Scheiner, E., & Thies, M. F. (2012). Political change in Japan: Electoral behavior, party realignment, and the public’s choice. Stanford University Press.
Saito, T. (2025). Komeito leader’s press conference announcing withdrawal from LDP coalition. Komeito Headquarters.
Shih, C.-Y. (2025). Post-election reflections: Tariff talks, inflation, and coalition fragility in Japan. Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
Stockwin, J. A. A. (2021). Governing Japan: Divisions and unity (5th ed.). Routledge.
Takahashi, S. (2025). Japan’s leadership crisis: The Ishiba administration after coalition collapse. Anadolu Agency Interview.
Takaichi, S. (2025). Statement following LDP leadership election victory. Liberal Democratic Party.


