Prof. Habib Badawi
Department of History, Lebanese University, Beirut, Lebanon
Email: [email protected] | [email protected]
ORCID: 0000-0002-6452-8379 | Scopus Author ID: 58675152100
Mr. Daniel Ayoub
Department of History, Lebanese University, Beirut, Lebanon
Email: [email protected]
- Introduction
The Horn of Africa occupies a unique strategic position at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and critical maritime trade routes connecting Europe and Asia. Comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, this region has experienced profound geopolitical transformation over the past decade. Unlike Cold War-era ideological rivalry, contemporary competition is driven by economic interests, security concerns, and power projection.
Three interconnected developments have intensified international attention since 2015. First, the region’s natural resource wealth—including oil, natural gas, minerals, and strategic water resources—has attracted significant foreign investment and competition. Second, maritime security concerns, particularly piracy in the Gulf of Aden and instability in Yemen, have prompted unprecedented deployment of foreign naval forces. Third, regional conflicts and state fragility have created opportunities for external actors to establish military footholds through basing agreements and security partnerships.
This paper examines military deployments, economic investments, and diplomatic initiatives by various state actors from 2015 to 2024. The analysis reveals how traditional regional powers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt), rising global actors (China, Turkey, and Iran), and established Western powers (United States and France) compete for influence through overlapping and sometimes conflicting strategies.
The research addresses three central questions: What strategic interests drive foreign powers to establish a military and economic presence in the Horn of Africa? How has competition among these actors affected regional stability and local governance? What implications does this competition hold for maritime security and international trade?
- Strategic Geography and Natural Resources
- Maritime Corridors and Global Trade
The Horn of Africa’s strategic value derives primarily from its control over vital maritime chokepoints. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, handles approximately 10% of global maritime trade and 40% of Europe’s seaborne commerce. This waterway, merely 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point between Djibouti and Yemen, has become a focal point of international naval presence.
The Red Sea corridor hosts 198 islands and archipelagos; many developed into forward operating bases (military installations positioned to support operations in forward areas). The strategic importance of these locations has increased dramatically since 2015, driven by instability in Yemen and concerns about Iranian influence in the region. Control of ports and islands along this route enables states to monitor shipping, project naval power, and potentially interdict maritime traffic during conflicts.
The Indian Ocean coastline of Somalia, stretching over 3,300 kilometers, provides additional strategic depth. Despite decades of instability, Somalia’s extensive coastline and deep-water ports have attracted interest from multiple foreign powers seeking to establish naval facilities and commercial port operations.
- Natural Resource Competition
Africa holds significant global reserves: 22% of oil and gas, 25% of gold, 80% of platinum, and 50% of diamonds. The Horn of Africa contributes significantly to this resource wealth, with Sudan and South Sudan possessing substantial oil deposits, Ethiopia developing major natural gas fields, and various countries in the region holding significant mineral reserves, including potash, lithium, and rare earth elements.
Competition for these resources has intensified since 2015, particularly involving Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Gulf-based investment vehicles. Chinese SOEs have expanded across Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, and Ethiopia, often accompanied by infrastructure development projects. These investments frequently include port facilities, railways, and roads designed to connect extraction sites to maritime export terminals.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), completed in 2023, exemplifies how infrastructure projects reshape regional power dynamics. With the capacity to generate 6,450 megawatts, the dam has created tensions with Egypt and Sudan over Nile water allocation while simultaneously positioning Ethiopia as a potential electricity exporter to neighboring countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Somaliland.
- The “Blue Economy” and Maritime Resources
Beyond traditional natural resources, competition has emerged over maritime economic zones and fisheries. The “Blue Economy”—sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth—encompasses shipping, fisheries, tourism, and offshore resources and has gained prominence in regional development strategies. Gulf states, particularly the UAE through Dubai World, have invested heavily in port development and logistics infrastructure to capture value from transshipment and maritime services.
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) have become increasingly contested, with disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, and various claims over Red Sea islands reflecting growing recognition of maritime resources’ economic value. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes maritime rights and responsibilities, has provided legal mechanisms for these disputes but has also intensified competition as coastal states seek to maximize their maritime claims.
- Military Basing and Power Projection
- Proliferation of Foreign Military Bases
The most visible manifestation of great power competition in the Horn of Africa has been the rapid expansion of foreign military bases since 2015. Djibouti hosts the highest concentration of foreign military facilities globally, including:
- China: The People’s Liberation Army Navy established its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, officially a “logistics facility” for anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations.
- France: The oldest foreign military presence, maintaining approximately 1,500 troops supporting regional operations.
- Italy: A smaller facility supporting Italian military operations in the region.
- Japan: A facility supporting Japanese naval forces engaged in anti-piracy operations.
- United States: Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, hosting approximately 4,000 personnel engaged in counterterrorism operations and naval patrols.
Saudi Arabia has secured access to military facilities in Djibouti through agreements signed in 2016, primarily supporting operations in Yemen. The concentration of competing powers in such proximity creates complex coordination challenges and potential for friction.
- UAE Military Expansion
The United Arab Emirates has pursued the most aggressive military expansion strategy in the region since 2015. Key developments include:
Eritrea: The UAE established a major military facility at Assab port in 2015, initially supporting operations in Yemen. This base includes air and naval components and has been used for combat operations across the Red Sea. The facility’s strategic location provides the UAE with power projection capabilities throughout the southern Red Sea and northern Indian Ocean.
Somaliland: In 2016, the UAE signed a 25-year agreement to develop and operate a military base at Berbera port. This facility includes a 4-kilometer runway for military aircraft and naval port facilities. The UAE’s investment in Berbera reflects both commercial interests in transshipment operations and military objectives related to maritime control.
The UAE’s basing strategy has created tensions with the Federal Government of Somalia, which contests Somaliland’s autonomy and views the Berbera agreement as undermining Somali sovereignty. This dispute illustrates how foreign military presence can complicate already fragile regional relationships.
- Regional Power Military Engagement
Turkey: Established its largest overseas military facility in Somalia in 2017, with the capacity to train up to 10,000 Somali troops annually. The base reflects Turkey’s broader Africa engagement strategy and positions Turkey as a security partner alternative to Western and Gulf actors. Turkey has also secured rights to develop Suakin Island off Sudan’s Red Sea coast, though implementation has faced delays.
Russia: While maintaining a lower profile than during the Soviet era, Russia has negotiated potential naval facility access in Eritrea and Sudan. In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government agreed to Russian naval base establishment at Port Sudan, though implementation remains uncertain following Sudan’s 2023 conflict.
Iran: Despite international sanctions, Iran has maintained relationships with Eritrea and developed connections with Houthi forces in Yemen, enabling indirect influence over Bab el-Mandeb maritime traffic. Iranian naval vessels have conducted anti-piracy patrols in the region, asserting presence despite opposition from Gulf states and Western powers.
- Gulf States Competition and Regional Dynamics
- Saudi-Emirati Alignment and Divergence
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pursued broadly aligned but increasingly divergent strategies in the Horn of Africa since 2015. Both states initially coordinated military operations in Yemen, using bases in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland for logistics and air operations. However, their approaches have diverged significantly.
Saudi Arabia has focused primarily on securing maritime flanks for Yemen operations, preventing Iranian influence expansion, maintaining traditional diplomatic relationships with established governments, and pursuing limited direct military basing compared to the UAE. In contrast, the UAE has pursued extensive port infrastructure investments through Dubai World, established multiple military bases providing independent power projection, developed direct relationships with sub-state entities (Somaliland, regional governments), and achieved economic penetration through diverse investments beyond ports.
This divergence became apparent when the UAE withdrew most forces from Yemen in 2019 while maintaining extensive infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, suggesting longer-term strategic objectives beyond the Yemen conflict.
- Qatar’s Alternative Approach
Qatar pursued a different strategy emphasizing diplomatic mediation and economic engagement before the 2017-2021 Gulf Cooperation Council crisis. Qatar mediated border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti, deploying peacekeepers that were withdrawn in 2017, sought investment opportunities competing with UAE initiatives, and developed relationships with Islamist-aligned political movements.
The 2017 blockade by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severely constrained Qatar’s regional engagement. Qatar’s withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from the Eritrea-Djibouti border in 2017 created a security vacuum and demonstrated how Gulf rivalries directly impact Horn of Africa stability.
Leaked communications in 2019 revealed allegations of Qatari involvement in supporting attacks on Emirati interests in Somalia, illustrating how Gulf competition can fuel local conflicts. While these allegations remain disputed, they reflect the intensity of rivalry and willingness to employ indirect methods.
- Regional State Responses
Horn of Africa states have navigated Gulf competition through various strategies:
Djibouti has maximized revenue by hosting multiple foreign bases while maintaining relationships with all major Gulf powers. President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s government has leveraged Djibouti’s geography to extract significant rents from base agreements and port operations.
Somalia has experienced internal divisions over Gulf relationships, with the Federal Government maintaining relations with Turkey and Qatar while some regional governments (particularly Puntland) developed closer ties with the UAE. These divisions have exacerbated existing federal-regional tensions.
Eritrea under President Isaias Afwerki has pursued transactional relationships with Gulf states, particularly the UAE, using base access and port facilities to secure economic support and diplomatic backing. Eritrea’s normalization with Ethiopia in 2018 was partly facilitated by Gulf mediation.
Ethiopia has balanced relationships with multiple Gulf actors while prioritizing access to port facilities through Djibouti and potentially Eritrea. Ethiopia’s landlocked status creates dependence on neighbors for maritime access, constraining its diplomatic options.
Sudan experienced dramatic shifts in Gulf relationships following the 2019 overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. The transitional government sought support from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt while attempting to normalize relations with the United States. Sudan’s 2023 conflict has further complicated these relationships.
- Global Powers: United States, China, and Others
- United States: Counterterrorism and Strategic Competition
U.S. engagement has evolved from a counterterrorism focus to include great power competition considerations. Camp Lemonnier serves as a hub for:
- Alleged counterterrorism operations targeting Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen.
- Drone operations across East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
- Intelligence collection on regional developments.
- Naval operations combating piracy and monitoring maritime traffic.
The establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 institutionalized American military engagement in Africa, though AFRICOM headquarters remains in Stuttgart, Germany. Between 2007 and 2024, the United States provided over $1.2 billion supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, later ATMIS) to combat Al-Shabaab and stabilize Somalia’s federal government.
U.S. strategy has faced challenges from China’s expanding economic and military presence. The proximity of Chinese facilities to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti has raised concerns about intelligence collection and operational security. Additionally, Chinese infrastructure investments have provided alternative development partners for African governments, reducing U.S. leverage.
- China: Belt and Road and Military Logistics
China’s engagement in the Horn of Africa represents the intersection of economic and strategic interests. Key elements include:
Infrastructure Investment: China has financed and constructed major projects, including:
- Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (completed 2016).
- Port facilities in Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania.
- Roads, telecommunications, and power generation across the region.
Military Presence: China’s Djibouti base, operational since 2017, officially supports anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, evacuation of Chinese nationals from conflict zones, and logistics for UN peacekeeping operations. However, the facility’s capabilities extend beyond these stated purposes: it includes piers capable of accommodating aircraft carriers, extensive munitions storage, and permanent accommodation for several thousand personnel.
Economic Engagement: Chinese SOEs dominate extractive industries in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. China has become the largest trading partner for most Horn of Africa states. Chinese loans for infrastructure development have exceeded $60 billion across Africa, with significant portions allocated to Horn of Africa projects.
Debt Dynamics: China’s lending has created concerns about debt sustainability. When Djibouti appeared unable to meet debt obligations in 2018, speculation emerged that China might convert debt into extended base access or port control. While such scenarios have not materialized in the Horn of Africa, they reflect broader concerns about Chinese lending practices.
- Other International Actors
France: Maintains its longest-standing African military presence in Djibouti, dating to the colonial era. France uses Djibouti as a staging ground for operations across Africa and the Indian Ocean, including support for counterterrorism operations in the Sahel.
India: Pursues primarily economic engagement focused on agricultural investments to secure food supplies, pharmaceutical exports, and textile market access. India maintains naval presence through anti-piracy patrols and seeks African support for UN Security Council aspirations.
Israel: Maintains low-profile but significant engagement, including intelligence cooperation with several regional governments, agricultural and water management technology transfers, security equipment and training sales, and strategic interest in Red Sea maritime security.
Japan: Maintains a military facility in Djibouti supporting anti-piracy operations, representing Japan’s most significant foreign military deployment. Japan also provides substantial development assistance across the region.
Russia: Limited compared to Soviet-era engagement but increasing. Russia supplies weapons systems to multiple regional governments and has negotiated potential base access in Sudan and Eritrea. Russian military contractors have appeared in Sudan and the Central African Republic, suggesting alternative engagement models.
- Impact on Regional Stability and Local Populations
- Conflict Dynamics and Proxy Competition
Foreign military presence and great power competition have complicated regional conflicts in several ways:
Yemen Spillover: The Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen have directly involved Horn of Africa territory through military bases in Eritrea and Somaliland launching air operations, naval blockade operations from regional ports, and recruitment of Sudanese fighters during the al-Bashir government.
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has generated refugee flows into Horn of Africa countries, particularly Djibouti and Somalia, while Houthi attacks on shipping have threatened Red Sea maritime security.
Somalia’s Fragmentation: International engagement has often reinforced Somalia’s fragmentation rather than supporting federal integration. Different foreign powers maintain relationships with specific regional governments or political factions:
- Ethiopia maintains security cooperation with southwestern regions.
- Kenya pursues interests in Jubaland.
- The UAE developed relationships with Somaliland and Puntland.
- Turkey supports the Federal Government and trains national forces.
These competing relationships have sometimes undermined efforts to build unified Somali security forces and have provided local actors with external patrons who can support resistance to federal authority.
Sudan’s Conflicts: The 2023 conflict between Sudan’s army and Rapid Support Forces reflects, in part, competing external relationships. Each faction cultivated distinct foreign supporters: the regular army maintained relationships with Egypt and sought Russian support, while the RSF developed connections with the UAE and operated gold mining benefiting multiple external actors.
External powers’ willingness to provide weapons and financial support has enabled conflict continuation and complicated mediation efforts.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Relations: The 2018 normalization between Eritrea and Ethiopia, following twenty years of tension after their 1998-2000 war, was partly mediated by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, Eritrea’s involvement in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict (2020-2022) demonstrated how external relationships can draw states into neighbors’ internal conflicts.
- Humanitarian Consequences
Military competition and regional instability have created severe humanitarian challenges:
Displacement: Of the 12.6 million internally displaced persons in Africa in 2016, approximately 8.6 million originated from East Africa, including significant numbers from the Horn of Africa. By 2024, protracted conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia had displaced millions more.
Food Security: Competition over Nile waters, particularly surrounding the GERD, affects downstream food production in Sudan and Egypt. Additionally, conflicts have disrupted agricultural production and distribution systems. Climate change impacts, including severe droughts, have been exacerbated by conflict and weak governance.
Refugee Flows: Yemen’s conflict has generated refugee flows into the Horn of Africa, while regional conflicts have created outward refugee flows, resulting in complex displacement patterns. Approximately one million Somali refugees resided in Yemen before 2015, with many subsequently displaced again.
Terrorism and Extremism: Poverty, conflict, and weak governance create enabling environments for extremist groups. Al-Shabaab in Somalia has conducted attacks across the region, including in Kenya and Uganda. The group’s resilience despite extensive counterterrorism efforts reflects underlying conditions that foreign military presence alone cannot address.
- Economic Development and Debt
Foreign investment has produced mixed outcomes for local development:
Debt Sustainability: However, infrastructure projects have generated substantial debt. Djibouti’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 100% by 2020, largely due to Chinese loans for port and railway projects. Ethiopia’s debt burdens have similarly increased, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability.
Employment and Technology Transfer: Foreign investments frequently employ Chinese contractors and labor rather than building local capacity. Limited technology transfer and skills development reduce long-term development benefits.
Infrastructure Benefits: Chinese-financed railways, ports, and roads have improved regional connectivity. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway has reduced transport costs and times between Ethiopia’s capital and its primary maritime gateway.
Port Competition: Multiple port development projects have created overcapacity in some areas. Competition between Berbera (Somaliland/UAE), Djibouti, Lamu (Kenya), and Mombasa (Kenya) for Ethiopian trade may result in underutilized facilities and unsustainable debt burdens.
- Maritime Security and International Law
- Piracy and Naval Patrols
Somali piracy peaked in 2011 with 237 attacks and prompted unprecedented international naval deployments. Combined Task Force 151, composed of ships from multiple countries, along with independent deployments by China, India, Russia, and others, conducted anti-piracy patrols. These operations have largely succeeded in suppressing piracy, with incidents declining to nearly zero by 2020. However, the naval presence established for counter-piracy has persisted and expanded beyond original mandates. Forces initially deployed for specific security missions have become platforms for broader power projection and maritime control. The legal frameworks justifying extended naval presence based on counter-piracy have been stretched to cover broader security concerns.
- Freedom of Navigation and Chokepoint Control
Control of maritime chokepoints raises questions about freedom of navigation. While international law guarantees “innocent passage” through territorial waters and “transit passage” through straits used for international navigation, practical control by states hosting military bases creates potential for coercion.
Incidents involving Iranian vessels in Red Sea waters have demonstrated how states controlling strategic locations can intercept, inspect, or harass shipping from specific countries. Similarly, Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have shown how non-state actors can threaten maritime security.
The concentration of military forces around Bab el-Mandeb creates potential for escalation during regional conflicts. Any military confrontation between major powers or regional states could rapidly affect global shipping, with immediate economic consequences.
- Exclusive Economic Zones and Resource Claims
Disputes over maritime boundaries and EEZs have intensified as states recognize potential offshore oil and gas deposits. Key disputes include:
- Somalia-Kenya (2021): A maritime boundary dispute over potentially resource-rich waters was adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, largely favoring Somalia’s claims.
- Eritrea-Ethiopia: Though Ethiopia lost sea access following Eritrean independence in 1993, historical claims and current arrangements regarding Eritrean port access remain contentious.
- Red Sea Islands: Various claims over islands, particularly in Yemeni waters, have created disputes involving Yemen, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia.
These disputes illustrate how UNCLOS frameworks, while providing legal mechanisms for resolution, have also increased incentives for maximizing maritime claims, potentially generating new conflicts.
- Future Trajectories and Policy Implications
- Scenarios for Regional Competition
Several possible trajectories exist for great power competition in the Horn of Africa:
Scenario 1: Intensification. Competition could intensify further, with additional states establishing military presence and existing actors expanding facilities. This scenario could emerge from escalating U.S.-China strategic competition, expanded conflicts in Yemen or Sudan drawing additional external actors, or new resource discoveries increasing economic stakes.
Scenario 2: Stabilization. Competition could stabilize at current levels if major powers recognize mutual interests in maritime security and conflict limitation, regional states develop greater capacity to balance external actors, or economic returns from investments fail to justify expanding commitments.
Scenario 3: Coordination. A more optimistic scenario involves increased coordination among external actors to support regional stability through agreed frameworks for military presence limiting competitive escalation, coordinated economic development approaches avoiding duplication, and multilateral approaches to security challenges like terrorism and piracy.
- Regional State Agency
Horn of Africa states are not merely passive objects of great power competition. Local actors have demonstrated agency in navigating external engagement:
Diversification: States can reduce dependence on any single external actor by diversifying partnerships. Ethiopia’s relationships with China, the UAE, Turkey, and Western powers exemplify this approach, though balancing competing interests remains challenging.
Leveraging Competition: States like Djibouti have successfully extracted significant benefits by hosting multiple competing powers. However, this approach requires delicate diplomatic management and is unsustainable if competition intensifies to demand exclusive alignments.
Regional Integration: Enhanced cooperation through organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) could increase collective bargaining power with external actors. However, regional tensions often undermine such cooperation.
- Implications for Global Order
Competition in the Horn of Africa reflects broader patterns of international relations in the 21st century:
Economic and Security Linkages: The integration of economic investments with military presence, particularly in China’s approach, represents evolution beyond traditional base access agreements. This model may become more common as powers seek to combine economic and security instruments.
Erosion of U.S. Primacy: The region illustrates declining U.S. ability to dominate strategic areas through military presence alone. China’s economic leverage and other powers’ willingness to engage regardless of U.S. preferences demonstrate the limits of American hegemony.
Multilateralism’s Limits: The proliferation of bilateral base agreements and lack of overarching coordination mechanisms highlight challenges to multilateral governance of security competition. No existing framework effectively regulates military base expansion or coordinates external engagement.
Relevance of Geography: Despite predictions that globalization and technology would reduce geography’s importance, control of strategic locations remains central to power competition. The concentration of military bases around narrow chokepoints demonstrates the continuing relevance of positional advantage.
Concluding Remarks
The Horn of Africa has become a critical arena for 21st-century geopolitical competition, driven by the intersection of strategic geography, natural resources, and maritime security concerns. The rapid expansion of foreign military bases since 2015, particularly in Djibouti but extending across the region, reflects intensifying competition among Gulf states, global powers, and regional actors.
This analysis yields several key findings:
First, contemporary competition differs from Cold War patterns through the multiplicity of actors involved and the integration of economic and military instruments. Rather than bipolar ideological competition, the region now hosts competing powers pursuing diverse objectives through overlapping and sometimes conflicting strategies.
Second, local agency matters despite asymmetric power relationships. Horn of Africa states have demonstrated the capacity to leverage competition for benefits, though this requires sophisticated diplomatic management and carries risks of entanglement in external conflicts.
Third, regional instability both attracts and is exacerbated by external engagement. Foreign powers often justify involvement by citing security threats, yet their presence frequently complicates conflict resolution by providing local factions with external supporters.
Fourth, maritime security frameworks established for specific purposes (counter-piracy) have been adapted to broader power projection objectives, raising questions about the relationship between legal justifications and actual strategic aims.
Fifth, economic development outcomes from foreign investment remain mixed. Infrastructure improvements have occurred, but debt sustainability concerns, limited technology transfer, and project duplication raise questions about long-term benefits.
The Horn of Africa will likely remain a competitive arena for the foreseeable future. The region’s strategic geography provides enduring value that transcends specific conflicts or political arrangements. Natural resources, particularly water and energy, will continue attracting foreign interest. Maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean routes will remain vital to global trade.
The challenge for regional states will be leveraging external engagement for development while avoiding entanglement in external powers’ conflicts. For external powers, the challenge will be pursuing legitimate interests while respecting regional sovereignty and contributing rather than undermining stability.
For the international community, the Horn of Africa’s experience raises broader questions about governance of geopolitical competition in strategic regions. The absence of effective multilateral frameworks for coordinating external engagement or preventing competitive escalation suggests a need for new approaches to managing great power competition in contested spaces.
Ultimately, sustainable stability in the Horn of Africa will require addressing underlying drivers of conflict—poverty, weak governance, resource scarcity, and political marginalization—rather than merely managing symptoms through external military presence. Whether current patterns of engagement will contribute to or hinder such fundamental improvements remains an open question that will significantly shape both regional trajectories and broader patterns of international relations.
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